The highest military body in Red China, the People’s Revolutionary Military Council, is made up of 22 of these 52 Red generals, and three-fifths of them are on the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Kennedy said that he was opposed to recognition of Red China. He indicated, however, that strong arguments had been presented to him in favor of the so-called “two Chinas policy.” Under this policy, Nationalist China would retain its seat on the Security Council, and Red China would have only a seat in the Assembly. This would mean that Red China would have only one vote out of about a hundred in the Assembly and would not be able to block UN action by veto. Kennedy said that proponents of this policy were contending that Red China could not do any damage in the UN under such circumstances.
Overseas, however, leading public figures urged on us a variety of different courses. For example, former Prime Minister Clement Attlee, returning early in September from a British Labor-party tour of Red China, confirmed reports that Mao Tse-tung had asked him and his fellow Laborites to pressure the United States into pulling the Seventh Fleet away from the waters around Formosa, which, Attlee added, the Communists have a "strong determination" to capture.
Millions of citizens are deeply disturbed that the military-industrial complex too often shapes national policy, but they do not want to be considered unpatriotic. Countless loyal Americans honestly feel that a world body such as the United Nations should include even Red China, but they fear being called Communist sympathizers.
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1970, Isa Alptekin, “LETTER, ISA YUSUF ALPTEKIN, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN TURKESTAN, TO PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON”, 出自 Wilson Center[5]，頁號 1:
The whole world has reason to be apprehensive of Red China, for it is likely to be an irresistible [sic] threat on earth. But what the majority of the mankind has as yet no inkling is the bitter fact that Red China is almost solely dependent on the territory of its New Dominion, Sinkiang, to carry out her expansionist design. If rightly evaluated, the land of Eastern Turkestan, which is being introduced to the outside world by the colonialistic [sic] attribution of ‘Sinkiang’ possesses all the necessary elements as a potential base for world wide expansion, not only in terms of its mineral wealth but also of its strategically unique position.
I thought that perhaps a sudden and effective air strike would convince the leaders in Hanoi that we were serious in our purpose and also that the North could not count on continued immunity if they persisted in aggression in the South. I realized the risks of involving the Soviets or the Chinese, as Senator Mansfield feared, I said, but neither of them was trying to bring peace or even urging restraint. I doubted that they wanted direct involvement themselves. I pointed out that our intelligence analysts believed Red China would not enter the war unless there was an invasion in the northern part of North Vietnam or unless the Hanoi regime was in danger of being toppled.
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1983 1月 2, “Prospects amid the dangers”, 出自 Free China Weekly[7], 卷 XXIV, 期 1, Taipei，頁號 1:
The criticism is excused in two different ways. First, it is said that the Chinese Communists are not going to attack us. Actually, there is a greater likelihood of that than of the Soviet Union assaulting the United States. Second, observers say that no matter how many weapons we get, they would be no match for the might of Red China. These views are as mistaken as those which hold that the USSR would never strike a blow at American and that the United States is already more than strong enough.
